A decision maker is asked to express her beliefs by assigning probabilities to certain possible states. We focus on the relationship between her database and her beliefs. We show that, if beliefs given a union of two databases are a convex combination of beliefs given each of the databases, the belief formation process follows a simple formula: beliefs are a similarity-weighted average of the beliefs induced by each past case.
on past outcomes of the treatment, and she can readily quote the empirical frequencies of these outcomes. Yet, patients are not identical. They differ in age, gender, heart condition, and several other measurable variables that may affect the treatment outcome. Let us assume that these form a vector of real-valued variables X = (X 1 , ..., X k ) and that X was measured for all past cases. Thus, case j is a (k + 1)-tuple (x j , ω j ) ∈ R k × Ω where, x j ∈ R k is the value of X observed in case j, and ω j ∈ Ω is the observed outcome of the treatment in case j. The new patient is defined by the values x t ∈ R k of X. How should these measurements affect the probability assessment of the physician?
It makes sense to restrict attention to those past cases that had the same X values as the one at hand, and compute relative frequencies only for these data. That is, to estimate the probability of state ω by its relative frequency in the sub-database consisting of all cases j for which x j = x t . However, large as the original database may be, the sub-database of patients whose X value is identical to x t might be quite small or even empty. Therefore, we wish to have a procedure for assessments of probabilities over Ω that makes use of data with different X values, while taking differences in these values into account.
Assume that the physician can judge which past cases are more similar to the one at hand, and which are less similar. In evaluating the probability of a state, she may assign a higher weight to more similar cases. Formally, suppose that there exists a function s :
measures the degree to which, in the physician's judgment, a patient whose presenting conditions are given by x t ∈ R k is similar to another patient whose presenting conditions are x j ∈ R k . Given a database of past cases ((x j , ω j )) j , we suggest to assign probabilities to the possible outcomes of treatment for a new patient with conditions x t by the formula,
where
is the unit vector assigning probability 1 to ω j . Observe that (unqualified) empirical frequencies (of states in Ω) constitute a special case of this formula, where the function s is constant. Another special case is given by s(x t , x j ) = 1 {xt=x j } .
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In this case, (1) boils down to the empirical frequencies (of states in Ω) in the sub-database defined by x t . Thus, formula (1) may be viewed as offering a continuous spectrum between the unconditional empirical frequencies and conditional empirical frequencies given x t .
In this paper we study the probability assignment problem axiomatically. We consider the relationship between various databases, modeled as sequences of cases, and the probabilities they induce. We impose two axioms on the probability assignment function. The first, invariance, states that the order of cases in the database is immaterial. This axiom is not very restrictive if the description of a case is informative enough, including, for instance, the time of occurrence of the case. The second axiom, concatenation, requires that, for every two databases, the probability induced by their concatenation is a convex combination of the probabilities induced by each of them separately. In behavioral terms, this axiom states that, if each of two databases induces a preference for one act over another, then the same preference will be induced by their concatenation. Under a minor additional condition, these two axioms are equivalent to the existence of a similarity function such that the assignment of probabilities is done as a similarity-weighted average of the probabilities induced by single cases. Two additional assumptions then yield the representation (1).
In our theorem, the function s is derived from presumably observable probability assignments given various possible databases. We interpret this function as a similarity function. Yet, it need not satisfy any particular properties, and may not even be symmetric. One may impose additional conditions, as in Billot, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (2004) , under which there exists a norm n on R k such that
Such a function s satisfies symmetry and multiplicative transitivity (that is,
The Bayesian approach calls for the assignment of a prior probability measure to a state space, and for the updating of this prior by Bayes's law given new information. Ramsey (1931 ), de Finetti (1937 , Savage (1954) , and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) provided compelling axiomatizations that justify the Bayesian approach from a normative viewpoint. But these axiomatizations do not help a predictor to form a prior if she is does not already have one. In this context, our approach can be viewed as providing a beliefgeneration tool that may be an aid to a predictor who wishes to develop a Bayesian prior.
Such a predictor may be convinced by our axiomatization that, in certain situations, it might be desirable to generate beliefs according to formula (1) .
Yet, just as Bayesian axiomatizations do not serve to choose a prior, our axiomatization does not provide help in choosing the similarity function.
Even if one adopts a certain functional form as in (2), the question still remains, which specific similarity function should we choose?
We believe that this question is, in the final analysis, an empirical one.
Hence, the similarity function should be estimated from past data. Gilboa, Lieberman, and Schmeidler (2004) axiomatize formula (1) for the case n = 2
(not dealt with in this paper), and develop the statistical theory required for the estimation of the function s, assuming that such a function governs the data generating process. The present paper provides an axiomatization for the case n > 2. In certain situations, it allows to reduce the question of belief formation to the problem of similarity assessment. Developing the corresponding statistical theory is beyond the scope of this paper.
Model and Result
Let Ω = {1, ..., n} be a set of states of nature, n ≥ 3.
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Let C be a non-empty set of cases. C may be an abstract set of arbitrarily large cardinality. A database is a sequence of cases, D ∈ C r for r ≥ 1. The set of all databases is
Observe that the same element of C may appear more than once in a given database. This structure implicitly assumes that additional observations of the same case do in fact add information. Indeed, when one estimates probabilities by relative frequencies, one subscribes to the same assumption.
For the statement of our main result we need not assume that C and Ω are a-priori related. We therefore impose no structure on C, simplifying notation and obtaining a more general result. Yet, the intended interpretation is as in the Introduction, namely, that C is a subset of R k × Ω. The prediction problem at hand, described above by x t ∈ R k , is fixed throughout this discussion. We therefore suppress it from the notation when no confusion is likely to arise.
For each D ∈ C *
, the predictor has a probabilistic belief p(D) ∈ ∆(Ω) about the realization of ω ∈ Ω in the problem under discussion.
For r ≥ 1, let Π r be the set of all permutations on {1, ..., r}, i.e., all 3 Our result only holds when the range of the probability assignment function is not contained in a line segment. The condition n ≥ 3 is obviously a necessary but insufficient condition for this requirement to hold. We mention it here in order to highlight the fact that the case n = 2 is not covered by our result. See Gilboa, Lieberman, and Schmeidler (2004) .
We formulate the following axioms.
Invariance: For every r ≥ 1, every D ∈ C r , and every permutation
The Invariance axiom might appear rather restrictive, as it does not allow cases that appear later in D to have a greater impact on probability assessments than do cases that appear earlier. But this does not mean that cases that are chronologically more recent cannot have a greater weight than less recent ones. Indeed, should one include time as one of the variables in X, all permutations of a sequence of cases would contain the same information.
In general, cases that are not judged to be exchangeable differ in values of some variables. Once these variables are brought forth, the Invariance axiom seems quite plausible.
The Concatenation axiom states that the beliefs induced by the concatenation of two databases cannot lie outside the interval connecting the beliefs induced by each database separately. If an expected payoff maximizer is faced with a decision problem where the states of nature are Ω, the Concatenation axiom could be re-stated as follows: for every two acts a and b, if a is (weakly) preferred to b given database D as well as given database E, then a is (weakly) preferred to b given the database D • E, and a strict preference given one of {D, E} suffices for a strict preference given D • E.
We can now state our main result. 
Theorem 1 Let there be given a function
and that the function p is defined for every database D, and a given point 
This application of formula ( * ) is more general than formula (1) in two ways: first,p(x t , c j ) need not equal p j , namely, the unit vector assigning probability 1 to state ω j . Second, s(x t , c j ) may depend on ω j and not only on (x t , x j ). To obtain the representation (1), one therefore needs two additional assumptions. First, assume that a state ω that has never been observed in the database is assigned probability zero. This guarantees thatp(x t , c j ) = p j . Second, assume that if the names of the states of nature are permuted in the entire database, then the resulting probability vector is accordingly permuted. This would guarantee the independence of s(x t , c j ) of ω j .
Limitations
Formula (1) might be unreasonable when the entire database is very small. Specifically, if there is only one observation, resulting in state ω i , p t assigns probability 1 to ω i for any x t . This appears to be quite extreme. However, for large databases it may be acceptable to assign zero probability to a state that has never been observed. Moreover, a state that has never been observed may not be conceived of to begin with. That is, for many applications it seems natural to define Ω as the set of states that have been observed in the past. In this case, (1) assigns a positive probability to each state.
The intended application of formula (1) The Concatenation axiom that we use in this paper is very similar in spirit to the Combination axiom used in Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) . Much of the discussion of this axiom in that paper applies here as well. In particular, there are two important classes of examples wherein the Concatenation axiom does not seem plausible. The first includes situations where the similarity function is learnt from the data.
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The second class of examples involves both inductive and deductive reasoning. For instance, if we try to learn the parameter of a coin, and then use this estimate to make predictions over several future tosses, the Concatenation axiom is likely to fail. The set of counter vectors obtained from all databases D ∈ C * is I = { I :
It is straightforward that for each I ∈ I such a D exists, and that, due to the Invariance axiom, p(D) is well-defined.
We now turn to state a version of our theorem for the counter vector setup. Observe that the concatenation of two databases D and E corresponds to the pointwise addition of their counter vectors. Formally,
The Concatenation axioms is therefore re-stated as the following. Observe that Theorems 1 and 2 are equivalent. We now turn to prove Theorem 2. It is straightforward to see that (ii) implies (i). Similarly, the uniqueness part of the theorem is easily verified. We therefore only prove that (i) implies (ii).
Combination: For every I, J ∈ I, p(I
+ J) = λp(I) + (1 − λ)p(J) for some λ ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem 2 Let there be given a function p : I → ∆(Ω). The following are equivalent: (i) p satisfies the Combination axiom, and not all {p(I)}
We start with the case of a finite C, say, C = {1, ..., m}.
Remark: For every I ∈ I, k ≥ 1, p(kI) = p(I).
Proof: Using the fact that p(I + J) ∈ [p(I), p(J)] inductively.
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This Remark allows an extension of the domain of p to rational-coordinate vectors. Specifically, given I ∈ Q C + , choose k such that kI ∈ Z C + , and define p(I) as identical to p(kI). The Remark guarantees that the selection of k is immaterial. It follows that one may restrict attention to p(I) only for
, that is, for rational points in the simplex of the case types. Restricted to this domain, p is a mapping from Q C + ∩ ∆(C) into ∆(Ω). We now state an auxiliary result that will complete the proof of (ii). , and every rational α ∈ (0, 1), , not all of which are collinear, and positive numbers {s j } j≤m such that,
Proof. Step 1: m = 3. Step 1.1: Simplicial points are in E:
The first simplicial partition of Q 
We first show that ( 
, and the line connecting p(q
Since not all p(q) are collinear, this intersection is unique. Hence (
Next consider the center of gravity of the four sub-triangles. For the triangle conv{(
k }, which is already known to be in E. Next consider the center of gravity of one of the three sub-triangles that have a vertex is common with conv{q
Assume, without loss of generality, that it is the triangle defined by {q 
Applying the claim inductively, we conclude that E contains all points that are vertices of simplicial sub-triangles of conv{q
Step 1.2: Completion: Step 2: m > 3.
Step 2 Step 1 to obtain a representation 
Step 2.2: Completion:
We prove the following claim by induction on k, 3 ≤ k ≤ m:
We conclude that p(q) = p s (q) holds for every rational q in the relative interior of conv({ q j | j ∈ K }), as well as for all rational points in p(q) ) and by vations are already included in the Ψ, whereas the prior should reflect the beliefs one has before obtaining these observations. At any rate, our approach in consistent with the Bayesian approach when applied to the space Ψ. Indeed, the only constraint imposed by the Bayesian approach at this level is the following "sure-thing principle": the posterior on Ω given a sequence of observations of length t is a weighted average of the posteriors given all possible continuations of the sequence of length (t + 1). (See Green and Park (1996) .) It is readily observed that our formula satisfies this constraint.
The standard application of the Bayesian approach in statistics is at an intermediate level: it assumes that the observations are drawn from Θ in an i.i.d. manner, but that the probability law of this process is not known.
Rather, there exists a prior over a certain set of possible probability laws. This prior induces a probability over all Ψ, but it imposes additional structure on the problem.
The prior of the probability law governing the data generating process should be derived from some theory, or past instances of similar statistical problems. However, if one uses Bayesian update at the level of the probability laws, and then deduces beliefs over Ω from it, one will typically not satisfy the Concatenation axiom.
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Hence our formula is inconsistent with this application of the Bayesian approach. Indeed, this inconsistency is apparent even if all observations in the database share their x values. In this case, our formula reduces to estimating probabilities over Ω by relative frequencies, and this method of estimation is, in general, inconsistent with Bayesian inference about the underlying probability law.
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Our formula proposes a method for assigning probabilities, which is an 7 See the Limitation sub-section below.
extension of simple relative frequencies. It is designed to deal with databases that are not homogenous, that is, that differ in their x values. But it does not attempt to deal with situations in which one can conceive of all the possible probability laws, and feel confident enough to have a prior over them.
